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Abstract
President Trump’s presidency can be characterized as unpredictable, controversial, and
unconventional. One such instance is America’s departure from decades of free-trade advocacy
under his administration and engagement in trade disputes with numerous nations. By viewing
the 2018 trade dispute through the political and economic perspectives, this thesis aims to
understand what the motivating factors are for Trump and his administration to pursue such
extensive protectionist policies. The author analyzes the tariffs through two main categories:
those that target an adversarial power, China, and those that target traditional allies like Canada,
Mexico, and the European Union. The thesis finds that, politically and economically, the
protectionist policies have a low likelihood of yielding a substantial payout for the Trump
administration. They also potentially threaten to undermine the U.S-built world order.
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Chapter 1 – The Art of Trade
“Trade wars are good, and easy to win.”1
This is one of the more peculiar tweets in President Trump’s collection of strange tweets
on his social media. However, this tweet represents the Trump administration’s stark departure
from decades of American-advocacy on free-trade. On the one hand, it is tempting for many to
dismiss this statement as one of the President’s more unusual statements. After all, many
Americans have become numb to their President’s behavior on Twitter. On the other hand, his
supporters can excuse this statement as part of Trump’s larger plan of negotiating more favorable
trade deals. They can point to his book, The Art of the Deal and claim these tweets and the
overall larger trade disputes levied on China and allies are all part of the plan. However, Trump’s
actions suggest a much bleaker picture.
President Trump understands that for all his bravado and hyperbolic statements
throughout his 2016 campaign, he needs to keep at least some of his promises. As his book notes,
“you can’t con people, at least not for long … if you don’t deliver the [results], people will
eventually catch on.”2 Indeed, one of Trump’s major foreign policy platforms in 2016 was on
trade and the unfair advantages that other countries have in free trade deals with the United
States. He has also promised to negotiate much fairer deals so that other countries can no longer
exploit America. Therefore, the President is incentivized to deliver results to his supporters.
However, there are legitimate concerns as to whether this trade dispute will be politically
and economically effective and beneficial in the long run. Perhaps for Trump, the toughest

Donald J. Trump, “When a Country (USA) Is Losing Many Billions of Dollars on Trade,” Tweet,
@realDonaldTrump, March 2, 2018.
2 Donald Trump and Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1988).
1
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enemies are those who have read his book. His protectionist policies have faced numerous
retaliatory tariffs that pose a serious threat to undermining global trade and compromising the
U.S. – built world order. For instance, when attempting to persuade French President Macron to
convince the E.U. to negotiate with the U.S. over trade measures, Macron referenced The Art of
the Deal and said that he knows that they “need to retaliate first [to have] some leverage in the
negotiation.”3
The primary goal of this thesis is to primarily answer the question of what factors drove
President Trump to depart from decades of free-trade precedents. It also assesses whether there
are genuine benefits to pursuing protectionist policies. Chapter two begins with an analysis of the
political reasons for Trump to engage in trade disputes with numerous countries. Namely, it
examines the benefits of fulfilling campaign promises. This is examined through two major tariff
targets: China and the rest of North America. It offers an explanation on why trade protectionism
against both adversaries and allies may pose serious political risks to the President in the longrun.
Chapter three addresses the question of whether the trade dispute will result in tangible
economic benefits. The first half of the chapter begins with a historical lesson on America’s last
major protectionist policy and moves to clarify the administration’s apparent misunderstanding
of trade deficit. The second half examines the economic reasonings of levying tariffs on China
and long-standing American allies. It finds that there are some legitimate reasons to target China.
However, there are dangerous risks to act the same way against allies.

Rosie Perper, “France’s Macron Reportedly Referenced ‘The Art of the Deal’ to Clap Back at Trump over an
EU Trade Dispute,” Business Insider.
3
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Finally, the last chapter will assess the President’s claim that trade wars are good and
easy to win. By culminating evidence introduced in the previous two chapters, this thesis
concludes that trade wars are much more nuanced than the President has put it. There are some
merits to the current path the administration follows but also legitimate concerns that may bring
serious consequences to the U.S. and the world
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Chapter 2 – Driven by Campaign Promises
During his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump made many controversial
comments. Many of them revolved around trade. A constant theme on his campaign trail is how
many of the country’s trade deals have been “bad.” From calling NAFTA the “worst trade deal
the U.S. ever signed”4 to claiming that the TPP “is an attack on America’s business,”5 Trump has
a strong disliking to many significant trade deals. However, while some critics have been quick
to dismiss the President’s comments as part of his overall unpredictable and unconventional
behavior, there are underlying political motives for him to instigate the 2018 trade dispute,
whether that is the renegotiation of NAFTA or the withdrawal from the TPP.
Simply put, Trump’s 2018 trade dispute is an attempt to secure domestic political gains
by fulfilling his campaign promises. The trade disputes are used as a tactic to secure support
from his critical support base through protectionist policies. Fulfilling his campaign promises
will provide the President with political capital for future elections. However, while the
administration’s intention may be to secure political advantages, it is also critical to examine
whether the desired effect has been achieved. This chapter first analyzes how fulfilled campaign
promises will provide political gains. It then examines the effects of the Chinese trade dispute
and the renegotiation of NAFTA, determining whether the fulfilled campaign promises will reap
long-term benefits.

Heather Gandel. “Fact Check: Trump Says NAFTA Was the Worst Trade Deal the U.S. Ever Signed.”
Fortune.
5 Adam Taylor. “Analysis | A Timeline of Trump’s Complicated Relationship with the TPP.” Washington
Post.
4
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The benefits of campaign promises
In economic theory, there are two primary benefits of protectionist trade policies:
boosting less competitive domestic industries and creating jobs for domestic workers.6 These two
economic advantages in some ways generate domestic political gains. By erecting protectionist
policies as the administration has done with tariffs, the President is seeking to protect critical
U.S. industry such as manufacturing that has been at a disadvantage due to globalization. With
globalization, more people and companies can interact with foreign entities. With the U.S. being
a developed country, it has highly established institutions such as labor unions and
environmental regulations that sometimes make it costlier for firms to operate. Thus, firms move
abroad to developing countries where they may find cheaper labor or more lax regulations to
reduce their costs.
As a result, it creates a decrease in domestic working opportunities. Protectionist policies
reverse this by making it more attractive for firms to stay home through methods such as
domestic subsidies to offset the higher costs and taxes to discourage firms from moving abroad.
Therefore, by helping previously neglected industries to boom again, it creates an increased need
for new workers to satisfy the new demand, which leads to new employment opportunities. For
the Trump administration, his support base has been one of the main victims of globalization and
the outflow of employment opportunities. He also understands that their support is critical to
future political success. Thus, he has elected to protect his voters’ vital industries.
Throughout the campaign trail, the President continuously echoed the message that
previous administrations had neglected domestic industries and allowed them to fall behind

6

Kimberly Amadeo. “Why Protectionism Feels So Good, But Is So Wrong.” The Balance.
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international competitors.7 In turn, he pledged to punish countries that cheat trade deals with
tariffs. The recent trade disputes with China and traditional allies demonstrate his commitment to
fulfill these promises. This strengthens Trump supporters’ belief that the President will follow
through on more of his campaign promises8 that he may not have had the chance to complete
before the end of his first term. As a result, future voters will view the President in a more
favorable perspective as he has kept his promise9 and more willing to support him on his next
campaign.
On the one hand, since the tariffs do not appear to have a negative influence on the
President's approval rating,10 it will only exemplify the positives of him keeping his word. This is
because Trump gains much more when he keeps his promise in districts that disproportionately
agree with and support him.11 On the other hand, had the President failed to uphold his promises,
he would have likely lost future voters since they would react harshly.12 Overall, this strategy is
politically logical as it provides the President with positive gains.
China vs. promises: which will prevail?
One of the major aspects during the 2018 trade dispute has been the ongoing trade rift
with China. As of November 2018, there has been a total of $250 billion worth of U.S. tariffs
exclusively applied to China.13 These tariffs were imposed in three rounds. The first round saw a
25 percent tariff on $34 billion of Chinese good that includes industry parts, vehicles, and

Kelsey Rupp. “Trump’s pro-American Trade Policy Is Just What He Promised.” Text. TheHill.
Tabitha Bonilla. The Strategy of Campaign Promises.
9 Ibid.
10 Scott Clement and Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Voters Hit Hard by Tariffs Are Standing by Him — for
Now.” Washington Post.
11 Tabitha Bonilla. The Strategy of Campaign Promises.
12 Ibid.
13 “The US-China Trade War: A Timeline.” China Briefing News. Last modified September 26, 2018.
7
8

7

chemicals. The second round placed a 25 percent tariff on $16 billion of Chinese goods that
include semiconductors, plastics, and electric scooters. Finally, another 10 percent that would
transition to 25 percent tariff was placed on $200 billion of Chinese goods that range from
electronics, food, tools, and housewares. With more threats of taxing nearly all Chinese
imports,14 the tension with China is arguably the most significant. As the two countries are the
world’s two largest economies, the outcome of this dispute may have widespread ramifications
for the current world order.
When the President referred to “America first” during his presidential campaign, he
meant a restoration of American pride in global politics. To his supporters, this was one of his
big selling points. After all, the motto of “Make America Great Again” has arguably become
synonymous with the President and administration. Upon taking office, Trump withdrew from
the Trans-Pacific-Partnership, a deal that took the Obama administration six years to craft and
negotiate.15 This is a move that signaled to both China as well as other countries that the U.S.
will be taking a radically different stance on free trade. It also sets the impression that the
President is trustworthy to his supporters as he committed to following through with his view of
the TPP.
As a result of pursuing America first policies in international trade, the administration
slapped tariffs on many Chinese imports to counter China's aggressive geopolitical expansion
ambitions. Throughout his campaign, Trump attacked China numerous times, claiming that the
country has crippled, taken advantage, and “raped” the US.16 He accused previous

“Trump Ready to Tax Virtually All Chinese Imports to US.” VOA.
Ann M Simmons. “Why the Obama Administration Thinks the Trans-Pacific Partnership Is a Good Deal.”
Latimes.Com.
16 Veronica Stracqualursi. News, A. B. C. “10 Times Trump Attacked China.” ABC News.
14
15
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administrations of failing to stand up to China, allowing the U.S. to lose its prestigious status.
This is another move that attempts to amplify his trustworthiness by committing to his campaign
promise: punishing those that attempt to take advantage of the country.
As a result, it appears that Trump has secured short-term political gains for the future.
However, there are doubts as to whether these moves will bring long-term political benefits. It is
interesting to note that regarding his America first stance, the President never meant it as an
isolationist position.17 Nonetheless, throughout his presidency, the country has become
increasingly isolated. From power vacuums in the Middle East to retreat on human rights
issues,18 the country has radically changed its stance in international politics compared to prior
administrations. The tariffs may bring unbearable long-term consequences at the cost of his
supporters. Furthermore, its decision to withdraw from the TPP may bring more harm than good
in the long run.
On the one hand, the TPP was designed to bring benefits to the machinery, auto, plastics,
and agricultural industries.19 Many of these industries are also the ones that supported Trump
pledged to protect. For industrial America, on the other hand, it was more ambivalent towards
the deal.20 However, for industries like agriculture, the deal would have brought $10 billion
worth of output over 15 years.21 By withdrawing from the TPP, the President is sacrificing his
supporters to keep a promise that has more uncertain consequences and unclear benefits.
Furthermore, by withdrawing from the TPP, the President provided room for other rival

Doyle McManus. “Trump Says He Stands for ‘America First.’ What Does That Mean?” Latimes.Com.
Michael Birnbaum and Griff White. “A Year of Trump’s ‘America First’ Agenda Has Radically Changed
the U.S. Role in the World.” Washington Post.
19 Kimberly Amadeo. “Trump Wants Back Into TPP.” The Balance
20 Catherine Boudreau. “Trump Country Hit Hard by Chinese Tariffs.” POLITICO.
21 Ibid.
17
18
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exporters to negotiate new deals that may lead to a higher competitive advantage over U.S.
exports.22 Indeed, it appears that the President has sacrificed the long-term wellbeing of many of
his supporters to fulfill his campaign promise.
For the tariffs on Chinese goods, it appears to be mostly a similar story. To counter the
decrease in domestic competitive advantage, Trump initiated a series of tariffs to protect these
industries. However, in response to these tariffs, the Chinese have enacted retaliatory tariffs that
profoundly impact many of the President's supporters.23 While there has been a lack of hostile
response from those impacted, it is because many have not yet felt the impact. For instance,
many of the farmers who produce products affected by the retaliatory tariffs signed contracts
before the tariffs were implemented. In other words, they sold their products at higher prices
with more favorable terms.24 As a result, many are waiting to see how the tariffs will affect their
contracts next year before deciding their stance.
Moreover, many of the Chinese tariffs were designed to cause tension between Trump
and his supporters. According to the Brookings Institute, 82% of the counties with tariffimpacted employment positions voted for Trump.25 As such, it is impractical to prolong the
tariffs since the Chinese have been very strategic in their response. It is also doubted that many
of those impacted can endure a period of rising production costs and lower selling prices.
Therefore, it is still ambiguous as to whether the pain26 that the President has urged his

22

Ibid.
Adam Behsudi. “Trump’s Trade Pullout Roils Rural America.” POLITICO Magazine.
24 Scott Clement and Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Voters Hit Hard by Tariffs Are Standing by Him — for
Now.” Washington Post.
25 Robert Maxim, Mark Muro, and Jacob Whiton. “How China’s Proposed Tariffs Could Affect U.S. Workers
and Industries.” Brookings, April 9, 2018.
26 Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Is Betting American Families Are Willing to Pay for His Trade War.”
Washington Post.
23
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supporters to bear is genuinely short-term. If the dispute with China does not conclude soon, the
situation will become much more difficult for his supporters – many may struggle to make ends
meet as it gets harder to find profitable contracts.
While the President's ability to fulfill his campaign promises may seem to be a political
gain at the moment, it may backfire in the long term since these promises come at the potential
cost of his supporters’ future wellbeing. Furthermore, his America first policy is not even aligned
with his intended definition and even lean more towards isolationist policies. China’s strategic
response only decreases the likelihood that his political gains will stand to last as more of his
supporters feel the negative consequences. Overall, there are serious risks in prolonging the
Chinese dispute if Trump wishes to accrue long-term political capital.
Promise fulfilled but little change
Besides targeting rivals in the trade dispute, the administration has also attacked
traditional allies. It seems strange for the United States to place tariffs on strategic long-standing
geopolitical allies like Canada and Mexico. In fact, the U.S. has placed more tariffs on allies than
it has on China.27 However, it can be understood as an attempt to secure his campaign promise of
resurrecting the American manufacturing industry28 and prevent American companies from
moving their productions abroad. In other words, the surprising move to target allies is arguably
a decision to boost Trump’s domestic credibility and trustworthiness. With a new trade deal in
place among Canada, United States, and Mexico, it seems that the administration’s bold moves

Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Has Officially Put More Tariffs on U.S. Allies than on China.”
Washington Post.
28 Steven Minter. “The Great Manufacturing Employment Challenge.” IndustryWeek.
27
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have paid some dividends. Regardless, these unusual moves come at significant risk and cost – it
may end up hurting the administration and the President's credibility in the long run.
Throughout his campaign, Trump bashed American companies for shifting their
productions overseas. Following his America first doctrine, the President vowed to create 25
million jobs.29 He specifically placed tariffs on steel and aluminum, components critical to the
manufacturing industry and the vital support base in the rust belt that helped him win the
election. Also, he has continuously called many previous trade deals horrific. Namely, he
claimed NAFTA to be "the worst deal in the history of the country."30 Therefore, for the
President, it is important to follow through on his campaign promises of both bringing back
overseas jobs as well as renegotiating deals like NAFTA.
One of the initial moves that the President pursued was to levy tariffs on steel and
aluminum. Besides citing concerns of national security, he cited unfair trade practices like
subsidized production as justification.31 According to the American Iron and Steel Institute, the
President’s tariffs on steel have brought job growth to rust belt cities like those in Illinois.32 In
the short term, the administration provided a good message for the Republican party to bring
back to the steel-producing states of Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Michigan.33 For the President
himself, he can claim the simple story that he has fulfilled his promise of resurrecting vital
American industries like steel. Indeed, the primary beneficiaries of these tariffs are steel
corporations. In addition, he managed to renegotiate an allegedly terrible deal to one that he

Heather Long. “Trump Vows 25 Million Jobs, Most of Any President.” CNNMoney.
Richard Partington. “Nafta: What Is It and Why Is Trump Trying to Renegotiate?” The Guardian, August
30, 2018
31 Thomas Gibson. “Tariffs on Foreign Steel Save American Jobs.” USA TODAY.
32 Ibid.
33 Thomas Biescheuvel and Luis-Ann Javier. “Winners and Losers From Trump’s Tariffs on Aluminum and
Steel,” March 1, 2018.
29
30
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claims to be more favorable, fulfilling a bedrock campaign promise.34 Overall, it appears that
Trump has succeeded to gain political advantages by keeping his word on campaign promises.
However, similar to the political advantages seemingly harnessed with the Chinese trade
dispute, there are more long-term risks that may backfire on the President and the administration.
Regarding the tariffs that claim to protect vital domestic industries’ interests, they are more
complicated than one may perceive. While they provide benefits to steel corporations, whether
these benefits will trickle down to its employees is up for debate. Moreover, for domestic
corporations that use steel or aluminum as a component like Anheuser-Busch, they may be
forced to lay off employees to offset increasing costs.35 These firms employ more workers than
the steel or aluminum industries. As a result, there may be a net loss of jobs with forecasts of
nearly 180,000 jobs lost as opposed to only 33,000 jobs gained.36
In fact, the steel and aluminum tariffs have been viewed unfavorably with a 50 percent
disapproval as opposed to 31 percent approval rating.37 Furthermore, the decrease in overall
manufacturing jobs cannot be solely blamed on unfair trade practices abroad. Over the past
decades, there has been a vast increase in worker productivity in the manufacturing sector:
shrinking from 25 jobs to 6.5 jobs to create $1 million worth of outputs. It would require an
unrealistic increase in worker productivity in a short amount of time to meet Trump’s

Mark Landler and Alan Rappeport. “Trump Hails Revised Nafta Trade Deal, and Sets Up a Showdown With
China.” The New York Times
35 Biescheuvel and Javier. “Winners and Losers From Trump’s Tariffs on Aluminum and Steel,”
36 Rachel Layne. “President Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Winners and Losers.”
37 William A Galston. “Support for Trump’s Tariffs Even Lower than His Job Approval Rating.” Brookings,
March 6, 2018.
34
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employment growth targets.38 Therefore, while there appear to be short-term political benefits
with the tariffs, it is likely that these positives will prove to be an overall cost to the country.
With regards to the newly negotiated trade deal for North America, the USMCA,
President Trump happily declared the deal as a “historical” transaction. However, there are
doubts as to whether serious changes exist with the new deal compared to the ill-received
NAFTA.39 For instance, the significant changes primarily impact automobile manufacturers and
dairy farmers. For car makers, they are now required to source 75 percent of materials from
North America as opposed to the previous 62.5 percent for the cars to be tariff-free with at least
40 to 45 percent of the parts made by workers earning a $16 minimum wage. For the dairy
industry, American dairy farmers now have increased access to the Canadian market that was
previously barred with Canadian quotas and import tariffs.40
These changes that Trump has called historical, may bring more harm than benefits. For
the auto industry, up to 1.6 million vehicles that were tariff-free under NAFTA will be subject to
tariffs due to the changed rule of origin.41 This would mean higher costs for both car
manufacturers and consumers with prices for new vehicles rising by $455 to $6875.42 While
Trump has cited this change as a means of incentivizing car manufacturers to stay,43 it may
provide the opposite incentive and lead to job losses. According to the Center for Automotive

Mark Liu, Muro and Sifan. “Why Trump’s Factory Job Promises Won’t Pan out—in One Chart.” Brookings,
November 21, 2016.
39 Anne Applebaum. “Opinion | Trump’s New NAFTA Is Pretty Much the Same as the Old One — but at
What Cost?” Washington Post
40 Alan Beattie and James Politi, “How Is Donald Trump’s USMCA Trade Deal Different from Nafta?”,
Financial Times, October 1, 2018.
41 “Meet the New NAFTA - USMCA.” Center for Automotive Research, October 16, 2018.
42 “Trade Briefing: Consumer Impact of Potential U.S. Section 232 Tariffs & Quotas on Imported Automobiles
& Automotive Parts.” Center for Automotive Research.
43 “UNITED STATES–MEXICO–CANADA TRADE FACT SHEET Rebalancing Trade to Support
Manufacturing” (Office of the United States Trade Representative, October 2018).
38
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Research, the rising prices will lead to a decreased demand of nearly 500,000 to two million
vehicles, affecting over 82,000 to 715,000 jobs.44
For the dairy industry, the increased access will add about $70 million to the existing
$230 million export market. However, it will not offset the Mexican and Chinese retaliatory
tariffs – costing American dairy exports $2.7 billion.45 In addition, the terms are similar to what
Canada had offered in another ill-received deal, the TPP.46 Therefore, the changes in the new
deal appear to be rather trivial. At the same time, they may lead to job losses and rising prices for
many Americans. Furthermore, the deal does not address the steel and aluminum tariffs that
affect Canada and Mexico.
It also is important to keep in mind that most Americans view NAFTA as good for the
United States.47 While more Republicans view NAFTA as a bad deal, this reflects an overall
partisan trend in the two parties’ views on free trade deals. 67 percent of Democrats are more
likely to view free trade deals positively whereas only 36 percent of Republicans believe in the
same.48 However, 56 percent of Americans believe that the pact is beneficial for the United
States with only 30 and 20 percent think that the deal is more favorable for Mexico and
Canada.49 Therefore, it seems somewhat unnecessary for Trump to renegotiate the deal.
Moreover, across all demographics and age groups, there are more Americans in support of

“Trade Briefing: Consumer Impact.” Center for Automotive Research
John Brinkley. “USMCA Is Not The Magnificent Trade Deal Trump Says It Is.” Forbes.
46 Landler and Rappeport. “Trump Hails Revised Nafta Trade Deal”
47 Alec Tyson. “Most Americans Say NAFTA Is Good for U.S.” Pew Research Center
48 Bradley Jones. “U.S. Support for Free Trade Agreements Rebounds, but Divisions Remain.” Pew Research
Center
49 Tyson. “Most Americans Say NAFTA Is Good for U.S.” Pew
44
45
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NAFTA. It remains to be seen whether this new deal would bring significant positive changes to
the country.
Overall, Trump may have appeared to be able to fulfill his campaign promises of
resurrecting key support bases’ industries and replacing an alleged horrible deal. In the short run,
this may bring political gains for the President, but the long-term picture is much murkier. In
particular, the steel and aluminum tariffs may bring greater costs to the country since Trump has
set unrealistic goals and created the potential for more severe job losses at the expense of fewer
gains. With NAFTA, the lack of real change brings doubt as to whether it was necessary for the
deal to be re-negotiated. Furthermore, the changes made may also adversely impact average
Americans in the long run. Ultimately, there are serious doubts as to whether the targeting of
traditional allies will pay long-term political dividends.
Conclusion
Even though President Trump's 2018 trade dispute with traditional allies and China may
appear to be a result of his often-unpredictable behavior, there are arguably underlying political
motives. Namely, the President may be attempting to secure political advantages for future
elections through fulfilling campaign promises to his voter base. Indeed, by following his
America first policy as justification for tariffs against China, erecting policies to protect critical
American industries, and withdrawing from allegedly terrible deals, it seems that Trump has
fulfilled his campaign pledges. As a result, he has boosted his image among his supporters as a
trustworthy and credible individual. There may be greater sentiments to re-elect the President to
fulfill his other campaign promises that he may not have had the opportunity in his first term.
However, the policies that Trump has pursued may put him at a greater political
disadvantage. While there is support for his actions against China, a prolonged tariff battle may
16

become an overwhelming burden for his supporters. By withdrawing from the TPP, he has given
leeway for other countries to explore new deals that exclude the US, which may place domestic
producers at a competitive disadvantage. Regarding his tariffs that protect his key supporters'
industries, there are unrealistic expectations concerning job growth and industry revival. It is
unreasonable to blame the decline in these industries to unfair trade practices. For the newly
negotiated USCMA, it is unclear whether there will be any real progress as it is largely similar to
the old NAFTA.
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Chapter 3 – A Lucky Hit and a Puzzling Decision
Even though the 2018 trade dispute originates from President Trump’s 2016 campaign
promises, the primary justification for initiating such a controversial action has been economic.
From citing concerns of the growing U.S. trade deficit to accusing unethical trade practices like
stealing intellectual property rights, the administration paints a picture that it must act. While
some of Trump’s justifications are valid, other reasons that drive the administration’s arguments
are more dubious. Furthermore, previous protectionist policies have hindered global economic
growth and left all parties worse off. In addition, the booming U.S. economy may serve as a
disguise – it may only conceal and delay the eventual negative consequences of the tariffs. These
misguided reasonings may ultimately harm U.S. and global economic development.
Overall, the administration’s use of the trade deficit as a central argument for the dispute
is a mistake. The trade deficit exists for much more complex reasons than Trump articulated.
This chapter begins with an analysis of what the consequences were after a significant
protectionist policy like the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. It then looks at how trade deficits work
and suggests that the administration lacks an understanding of deficits. It then moves to examine
the economic reasoning behind the disputes with China to determine whether there are valid
concerns. Finally, the chapter assesses why the administration decided to initiate the puzzling
move to engage in trade disputes not just with China but also with strategic U.S. allies.
History lesson with Smoot and Hawley
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was one of the major U.S. tariff acts enacted over the past
century. It was passed to mainly respond to overproduction in the global market that squeezed
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American producers.50 Despite over 1,000 prominent economists of the time opposing the
measure, Congress approved the tariff anyway.51 The tariffs increased import duties by about 20
percent on average. Coupled with deflation, the tariffs reduced imports by about 12-20 percent.52
Other countries like Canada and Europe soon followed suit with retaliatory measures, leading
exports to tumble – from $7 billion in 1929 to $2.5 billion in 1932. With exports composing
nearly seven percent of national productions in the 1930s, the collapse of international trade had
a significant impact on both domestic and international economies.53
The tariffs further contributed to the slowdown of the economy and the first stage of the
Great Depression. It increased the costs for trade-reliant producers. For example, there were over
500 U.S. plants that employed over 60,000 people to make cheap clothing from imported wool
rags. Under the tariff, imported wool rags’ price rose by 140 percent, making it prohibitively
costlier.54 Moreover, the reduction in exports meant that fewer U.S. dollars were circulating in
the international monetary system. Besides raising the difficulty for foreign countries to repay
U.S. debts, it further reduced exports. The high tariffs on foreign goods also meant a decrease in
domestic demand for foreign goods and currency. As such, it artificially appreciated the U.S.
dollar against foreign currency, which exacerbated the reduction in exports.55 Overall, global
trade fell a staggering 65 percent.56
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In terms of the current trade dispute, Smoot-Hawley serves as a good historical lesson:
protectionist trade policies incentivize economically inefficient behaviors that can undermine
U.S. reputation and growth. In fact, the current trade dispute has the potential to be more
devastating than Smoot-Hawley. First, trade barriers encourage other countries to retaliate. Irwin
argues that, while the Smoot-Hawley tariffs’ impact on trade viewed strictly by itself is relatively
minor,57 the ripple effect of the tariff devasted trade. It led to retaliatory tariffs, which forced
many domestic industries to face increased costs. President Trump’s tariffs have already led to a
myriad of retaliatory tariffs on over $80 billion of U.S. goods.
Second, the post-World War II global trade order was established by the United States
through rounds after rounds of free-trade agreement negotiations. Protectionism and retaliation
threaten to undercut this U.S. built foundation. In other words, it can hamper U.S. influence in
international politics since there is a risk that the American role in global trade is reduced. Third,
while the current U.S. economy is unlike that of the 1930s, it does not eliminate the risk of an
economic slowdown. For Smoot-Hawley, the immediate onset of the Great Depression helped
policymakers realize the strain the tariffs have on domestic producers, hastening its abolishment.
The current economic boom actually has the opposite effect – the tariffs’ effects may not be felt
until a much later date. Moreover, as American exports now comprise 13 percent of GDP58 as
opposed to only 7 percent during the 1930s along with a more integrated global economy such as
more interconnected global supply chains, the current trade dispute may have a more severe
impact than Smoot-Hawley. In fact, the IMF only projects a 3.7 percent growth on global trade
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due to the trade disputes, 0.2 percent lower than last forecasted.59 Therefore, it is important to
draw upon the lessons from Smoot-Hawley and keep in mind that current trade policies have the
potential to be even worse than one of the most major protectionist policies in recent American
history.
Trade deficit the scapegoat
President Trump claimed that the country “lost $817 billion on trade last year”60 on
Twitter. He is wrong. The net trade deficit in 2017 was $552 billion.61 Although it is tempting to
dismiss this statement as just one of the President's many controversial and flat-out incorrect
tweets, it represents his attempt to mischaracterize and wildly exaggerate what trade deficits are.
Simply put, a trade deficit is when one country imports more goods and services than it exports.
Conversely, a trade surplus is when one country exports more than it imports. Therefore, a trade
deficit is not equal to losing money nor is a trade surplus equal to earning money.62
For most economists, trade deficits are neither good or bad. It depends on the
circumstances. In other words, they are not inherently bad as Trump has described them to be.
To better understand trade deficits, it is necessary to recognize the national accounting measure –
the balance of payments. B.O.P. measures the current and capital accounts. The current account
refers to goods and services, investment income, and uncompensated transfers like foreign aid.
Capital account comprises of investment assets like real estate, stocks, bonds, and government
securities.63 Theoretically, this measure equates to zero because if a country runs a deficit in one
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account, it will be made up with a surplus in the other. Therefore, trade deficits are also affected
by other macroeconomic factors that include saving and investment rates and currency values.
Changing trade policy has minimal effect on the trade deficit.64
Regarding saving and investment rates, it is related to exports and imports in that a
country will export its excess savings as the net foreign investment, which means a capital
account deficit. As the U.S. imports more, it must also experience more investment, leading to
more capital imports and a capital account surplus. This excess leads to higher consumption,
which is made up by imports of goods and a current account deficit.65 Currency values also have
a major influence. For instance, if there were a flow of net investments into a country, the
demand for that country's currency would rise and appreciate. On the one hand, it would mean
that the country's exports would become less competitive since they are more expensive. On the
other hand, imports would become cheaper. This change in imports and exports would occur
until it matches the capital account as foreign investors seek to outbid domestic consumers for
the currency until their demand for foreign assets is satisfied.66
Consider Germany before and after the Cold War. West Germany consistently had a
current account and trade surplus. However, after the Berlin Wall was toppled, Germany's
current account suddenly switched into a deficit. This was not because of unfair trade barriers
from German trading partners but the reintegration of East Germany. The need to rebuild a
relatively backward country led to the need for large domestic investments, causing a decrease in
German savings that had been going abroad and, in turn, led to the appreciation of the Deutsche
Mark. Therefore, it led to a decrease in exports and a rise in imports as German products became
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more expensive, which caused a trade deficit.67 Similarly, the U.S. trade deficit is not caused by
unfair foreign trade practices but by its domestic macroeconomic policies and the dollar’s status.
For the U.S., there is a higher demand for capital than the amount of domestic savings.
This increased attractiveness for investing leads to higher domestic interest rates, which
appreciates the dollar. Furthermore, with free-flowing exchange rates and liberalized capital
flow, foreign capital inflow allows Americans to consume more than they produce, which
manifest itself in the trade deficit.68 For other countries, this amount of trade deficit is simply
unsustainable. However, as the dollar is the dominant global reserve currency since many believe
it a safe asset to hold, it is arguably natural for the U.S. to run such a deficit. Economist Robert
Triffin warned that the provider of the global reserve currency would need to run perpetual trade
deficits.69 Furthermore, the dollar’s desirability is also driven by the size of the American
economy and the ubiquity of the dollar among foreigners.70 Moreover, foreign countries will
have little incentive to change to alternative reserve currencies because this will create
instability. Therefore, the dollar's prestigious status places upward pressure on its exchange rate
and leads to the U.S. to import more than it exports.71
Since the U.S. trade deficit is mostly driven by its domestic macroeconomic policies and
the dollar's status, it is doubtful that protectionist policies will effectively reduce the deficit. For
instance, tariffs would likely lead to a reduction in American imports, which reduces the number
of dollars flowing into the international monetary system and appreciates the dollar. This
stronger dollar only means a reduction in exports and an increase in imports until the trade
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balance matched the savings and investment balance.72 Essentially, without changing the savings
and investment rates, tariffs would only leave Americans poorer by reducing the volume of
exports and imports. This is already taking place with Trump’s tariffs. With exports plunging,
the trade deficit increased $31 billion (8.6%) compared to the amount a year ago.73 Indeed, it
appears that it is rather ineffective to use tariffs to address the trade deficit since it is a natural
manifestation of domestic macroeconomic policy and the dollar’s status as the global reserve
currency.
The lucky hit
The trade fight between the two largest economies in the world has had a profound effect
on the global economy. For the President, it appears that he has the upper hand. The U.S.
economy is booming whereas the Chinese economy has shown signs of a slowdown. Trump still
has more Chinese imports to tax whereas the Chinese are running out of American imports on
which to impose tariffs. While the trade deficit between the two countries has not closed, this is
arguably due to the President's misunderstanding of how trade deficits work. The tariffs
nonetheless attempt to address a legitimate economic concern: the unfair advantages and
disadvantages that Chinese and foreign corporations receive. Namely, this refers to the alleged
artificial depreciation of the yuan, the subsidies that boost domestic firms’ competitiveness, and
the bureaucratic red-tape that foreign firms have to overcome to enter the Chinese market such as
forced technology transfers.
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President Trump has long accused China as a “currency manipulator.”74 By artificially
suppressing the yuan’s value, the Chinese government can make its exports more competitive in
the global market and imports more expensive. It is true that China has been the culprit in
manipulating its currency around the turn of the millennium. From 2000 to 2014, China boosted
its foreign reserve by $4 trillion, as it readily bought dollars to depreciate the yuan. 75 Until 2005,
the yuan was also strictly pegged to the dollar.76 However, the Chinese government recently
shifted away from this practice. Much of the currency manipulation has been actually attempting
to appreciate the yuan artificially.
After the effects of the 2008 global recession improved, the yuan steadily declined as
foreign investors sought better opportunities elsewhere and the Federal Reserve announced rate
hikes.77 To counteract a severe currency depreciation, the Chinese have been selling off its dollar
reserve. As of October 2018, it has fallen nearly $1 trillion from its peak of $4 trillion.78 As a
result, the yuan appreciated 10 percent over 2017.79 Moreover, to reduce the risk of capital flight,
the government has clamped down on the ability to move the yuan across borders. For instance,
the government implemented a new policy that prohibits individual citizens from moving more

Donald J. Trump, “Russia and China Are Playing the Currency Devaluation Game,”Tweet,
@realDonaldTrump, April 16, 2018.
75Eduardo Porter, “Trump Isn’t Wrong on China Currency Manipulation, Just Late,” The New York Times,
April 11, 2017, sec. Business.
76 David Barboza and Joseph Kahn, “China Says It Will No Longer Peg Its Currency to the U.S. Dollar,” The
New York Times, July 21, 2005, sec. International Business.
77 Ana Maria Santacreu and Zhu Heting. “Causes and Effects of China’s Falling Foreign Reserves,” St. Louis
Federal Reserve.
78 “China Foreign Exchange Reserves | 1980-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar,” Trading Economics.
79 Huileng Tan, “Chinese Yuan against the Dollar: China Currency Appreciation,” CNBC, last modified
February 22, 2018.
74

25

than $50,000 out of the country annually.80 In effect, the authorities are trying to limit the
amount of yuan that can circulate in the global monetary exchange to drive up its value.
To complicate matters further, China does not fit the criteria of currency manipulation
under the 2015 Trade Enforcement Act. To qualify, a country needs to have a large overall
current account surplus, a large bilateral trade surplus with the United States, and engage in
persistent one-sided intervention in its currency market to prevent appreciation.81 Currently,
China only meets one of these criteria – a large trade surplus. Moreover, its current account
surplus has switched to a deficit82 as Chinese authorities try to combat the market-driven
depreciation of the yuan. Therefore, it is difficult to label China as the "grand champion of
currency manipulation" as Trump claimed.83 The country was guilty, but that was more than ten
years ago.
Even though it may be difficult to label China as a currency manipulator, the country's
extensive use of subsidies and tariffs that favor domestic firms are well-documented. In a joint
statement issued by the U.S., Japan, and the E.U., it called for new rules to regulate industrial
subsidies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The three countries also barely veiled their
discontent with China, calling it “an advanced WTO Members claiming developing country
status” and urging the Chinese government to shoulder more responsibilities.84 SOEs can also be
seen as an extension of these subsidies as they have the entire government to fall back on.
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Indeed, these industrial subsidies shield many domestic industries from global competition and
hide some firms’ economic inefficiencies.
Regarding industrial subsidies, China has protected domestic industries and boosted
exports. For instance, subsidies with export share requirements (ESR), where firms must meet a
certain export threshold for their production, have had a great effect on Chinese firms. China has
a staggering number of exporters eligible for ESR subsidies: half of all exporting firms in China
are eligible as they sell more than 70 percent of their products abroad. This means that an
extensive percentage of Chinese producers are protected even if they have low-profitability.85
For example, in the solar industry, government subsidies have helped China’s industry grow ten
times while depressing world price by 75 percent due to the flooding of solar panels in the global
market.86 These subsidies have helped to artificially lower the prices by 25 to 30 percent of
comparable products from the U.S. or the E.U.
China’s electric vehicle (EVs) industry is also one of the government’s favorite target for
generous subsidies. In 2017, about 770,000 EVs were produced and sold in China, a 53 percent
increase from last year and about four times the amount sold in the United States. This growth is
largely attributed to generous government subsidies. To consumers, the government provides
$10,000 worth of subsidies per EV purchased along with attractive policies like assured license
plates that have a 0.1 percent issue rate in some provinces. To EV producers, government
subsidies account for more than 50 percent of the cost of the batteries. For example, government
subsidies and grants have accounted for nearly 19 percent of Geely’s, a leading Chinese
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automobile manufacturer, gross profit at one point. 87 It is projected that the total number of EVs
in China will reach 2 million in 2020.88 In other words, the government has been covering the
economic inefficiencies of domestic companies that would have been otherwise exposed by the
market and artificially boosting industries that would have been unprofitable in the short run.
Consequently, when government subsidies for the solar industry declined, many solar-panel
producing firms, particularly those unprofitable, defaulted on their loans.89 When government
subsidies for EV manufacturers declined, sales for carmakers like BYD fell 20 percent.90
In terms of SOEs, they are protected by the government from competition and even
bankruptcy.91 This is accomplished primarily through an assured market share for these firms.
Non-state-owned enterprises are prohibited from expanding beyond a certain position.92 For
instance, the Chinese aviation industry is primarily comprised of three major state-owned
airlines: China Southern, China Eastern, and Air China. Together, they account for a domestic
market share of 77 percent.93 The fourth largest and privately-owned airline, Hainan Airlines,
only accounts for 7 percent of the market share.94 In contrast, the three big U.S. airlines –
American, Delta, and United Continental take up only 50 percent of the market share.95 It is also
doubtful whether competition can genuinely exist between these state enterprises. It is a common
practice for the state to appoint Communist Party officials to senior executive positions in these
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SOEs. In effect, the Party is coordinating large and key sectors to work together, running the
country like a business.96 Therefore, the extensive market consolidation in China, and a lack of
real competition, insulates SOEs and arguably creates state monopolies.97
Perhaps the coercive technology transfer practice has been the most contentious issue for
the Trump administration. The White House claims that China has been one of the main culprits
of intellectual property theft and accounts for 87 percent of counterfeit goods seized entering the
United States.98 It identified forced technology transfer, licensing at less than economic value,
state-directed acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology, and outright cyber theft as egregious
policies that risk 44 million American technology jobs. Specifically, for forced technology
transfers, the administration claims that China uses foreign restrictions, administration review,
and licensing processes to acquire these technologies.99 The Chinese have rejected the argument,
claiming that the U.S. argument is pure speculation and based on a presumption of guilt.100
Forced technology transfers refer to situations when foreign firms are coerced by the
government through exploitative policies to transfer strategically significant technology to
independent domestic entities. In China’s case, the government utilizes its attractive market size
as leverage to “convince” foreign firms to hand over their technologies if they want to enter the
market. For instance, as many strategic industries in China are dominated by the state, foreign
firms in these industries that want to gain market access will have to work with domestic SOEs.
As these industries follow government orders, which have gradually pivoted to purchasing more
Chinese products, they increasingly insist foreign firms transfer their technologies to nascent
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domestic companies as a precondition. This is done in the hope that domestic companies will
learn and develop the capabilities to produce these products in the future, eventually eliminating
the need to rely on foreign technologies.
While some have dismissed this issue as overstated for the U.S. and the benefits
exaggerated for China,101 there is real harm of such coercive technology transfers to global
innovation spirit. According to the Coase Theorem, low transaction costs and well-defined
property rights are the fundamental building blocks to maximize efficiency. Similarly, welldefined and enforced intellectual property rights are also key incentives for individuals and firms
to innovate. Furthermore, forced technology transfers may bring unexpected long-term costs to
the firm.
A good case study to understand the negative consequences of forced technology
transfers is with the Japanese firm, Kawasaki. Capturing the Chinese government’s desire to
modernize its mass-transportation system, Kawasaki established a joint-venture with Chinese
manufacturers to construct a high-speed rail system, which is a key strategic industry to the
government. While the contracts were enticing, Kawasaki also feared that it would lose its
competitive edge if it chose not to participate in the Chinese market. However, it also did not
realize that after Chinese manufacturers had acquired and learned the technology, Kawasaki
would be phased out of the Chinese rail industry. Furthermore, these domestic firms like the
state-owned CRH would become fierce competitors on the global stage, working on projects in
Venezuela and Turkey while bidding for contracts in the U.S., Brazil, and Russia. The Chinese
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manufacturers also misled Kawasaki: they filed for patents that were intended solely for
domestic use.102
In the EV auto industry, there also exists the potential for similar exploits. For foreign
automakers to enter the Chinese market, they have to conduct joint-ventures with domestic
producers as the majority owner. The government also requires foreign automakers to
incorporate new EV technologies in any production of EVs.103 For instance, in late 2016, a new
Chinese law mandates that all EV producers demonstrate that they own the technology to
produce the entire vehicle. However, foreign-owned technology cannot be counted. Essentially,
it requires foreign companies to transfer their foreign technology to the domestic entities for it to
obey the law and continue production.104 As seen through Kawasaki’s example, these technology
transfers often do not end positively in the long run.
Moreover, mandatory technology audits prior to mass production begins appear to be
fraudulent. Foreign carmakers have accused Chinese auditing teams and domestic carmakers of
collusion: “when the audit begins, the inspectors asked for only the blueprints of the EV
components that the foreign company was striving to protect from its Chinese JV partner.”105
However, these practices do not appear to drive foreign carmakers away. Franco-Japanese
company Renault-Nissan recently signed an EV JV with Chinese company Dongfeng Motors.
Ford also partnered with Zotye Autos to produce EVs.106 These partnerships in existing
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conditions create risky situations in which foreign companies may follow a similar path as
Kawasaki. As such, the firm that transfers the technology may find the initial deal lucrative and
entry to a new market tempting. However, once the transfer is complete, new competitors may
emerge that pose a serious threat in the long run. Overall, the lax intellectual property protection
laws as well as the forced technology transfers are the primary drivers that both discourage
innovation and harm firms in the future.
Ultimately, industrial subsidies and forced technology transfers are legitimate sources of
concern for the U.S. in contrast to concerns over currency manipulation. On the one hand, the
extensive subsidies protect unprofitable firms while the hyper-consolidated SOEs create real
concern for fair trade terms. In particular, the insulation from global protection places U.S. firms
at a disadvantage. On the other hand, the forced technology transfers harm not only U.S. but also
global innovation sentiment. The lax IP law enforcement creates a situation in which foreign
firms can be misled to share technologies that will be detrimental to their future wellbeing.
The puzzling move
While President Trump's trade battle with China has some logic, his decision to attack
long-standing allies is more puzzling. Specifically, Trump has placed tariffs on steel and
aluminum coming from Europe and North America using the justification of protecting national
security. However, the reasoning and the tariff targets are misplaced. In the long run, these tariffs
will damage not only the U.S.’ reputation but also the global economy. As such, imposing these
tariffs based on incorrect reasoning is a dangerous gamble for the Trump administration.
In June 2018, the U.S. announced steel and aluminum tariffs of 25 and 10 percent
respectively on the EU, Canada, and Mexico. It also offered few details on what these countries
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could do to end these tariffs.107 The President justified them as measures to protect national
security. However, the definition of it was rather broad. Commerce Secretary Ross believes that
“national security is broadly defined to include the economy, to include the impact on
employment [and that] economic security is military security.”108 A Commerce Department
investigation also reports that the current quantities of steel imports weaken the economy and the
lack of domestic aluminum production may decrease U.S. military manufacturing independence.
However, while the Secretary of Defense acknowledges the decline of domestic manufacturing,
he also notes that the military’s requirement for steel and aluminum only represent about three
percent of U.S. production and current capabilities do not affect DoD’s ability to acquire the
necessary steel and aluminum.109 Therefore, current production capabilities are adequate.
In addition to the negligible impact that steel and aluminum imports have on the military,
it is also unclear the national security threat that traditional allies pose. Canada is the largest
source of steel and aluminum imports, accounting for 17 percent of steel and 36 percent of
aluminum for 2017.110 The administration’s reasoning on how Canada would constitute a
national security threat – in this case, by failing to provide the necessary aluminum and steel – is
unclear. The logic is further muddled when Canada is formally considered a part of the American
technology and industrial base. Under Title 10 of the U.S. code, items are considered foreign
when they are not sourced from the United States or Canada.111 Therefore, these tariffs are
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confusing and harm the relationship with long-standing U.S. allies. As Canadian Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau puts it:
Our soldiers who had fought and died together on the beaches of World War II, on the
mountains of Afghanistan and have stood shoulder-to-shoulder in some of the most
difficult places in the world, that are always there for each other, [the idea that Canada is
a national security threat] is insulting to them.112

While U.S. allies find it absurd to see themselves referenced as national security threats,
they nonetheless initiated retaliatory tariffs. The EU, Mexico, and Canada have all filed
complaints in the WTO regarding U.S. actions. The E.U. placed a 25 percent tariffs on iconic
American goods like whiskey, tobacco, and Harley Davidson products worth about $3.2
billion.113 Mexico’s retaliatory tariff focused on U.S. agricultural exports like apples and
cranberries as well as American steel products. It imposed a tariff between 15 and 25 percent that
will cover nearly $3 billion goods.114 Canada imposed 10 and 25 percent tariffs on U.S.
aluminum and steel imports worth about $13 billion.115
The tariffs and retaliatory tariffs also pose significant harm to the U.S. and global
economy. Even though these tariffs may benefit domestic steel and aluminum manufacturers, it
will harm the downstream producers that rely on these products as these products are now more
expensive. For instance, forecasts show that the auto industry, which relies on steel, can expect
declining sales that potentially lead to job losses of up to 40,000 – nearly a third of the entire
steel industry workforce. In short, the auto industry’s job losses would nullify any job gains in
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the steel industry.116 Overall, it is estimated that for every steel or aluminum job gained, sixteen
would be lost in return. According to consulting firm Trade Partnership Worldwide, the
President’s steel and aluminum tariffs would lead to a net job loss of over 400,000.117
To complicate matters further, Trump's tariffs are also hitting the wrong targets. There is
a significant issue with global steel trade: overcapacity, which refers to when a domestic
manufacturer produces more than its domestic consumers can absorb and is incentivized through
unfair trade practices to sell internationally. However, steel overcapacity is not caused by the
E.U., Canada, or Mexico. China causes it. Chinese steel overcapacity is roughly 130 million
tons, which is 65 percent higher than total U.S. crude steel production in 2016.118 As such,
Trump's tariffs hit close allies like Canada and Mexico harder than the real culprit. Furthermore,
the new USMCA does not address these tariffs, putting the retaliatory tariff in place for the time
being. Therefore, there continues to exist a threat to the economy and key sectors like the
automobile industry. Coupled with the stricter criteria for automobiles to be tariff-free, it
increases the difficulty for car makers to produce USMCA-eligible cars.
Ultimately, President Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are confusing and dangerous.
They are misdirected and do not truly address the problem of global steel overcapacity. They
pose significant risks to the U.S. economy in the form of job losses that outweigh any job gains
in the aluminum and steel sectors. They also can adversely affect U.S. relationships with longstanding allies that find it insulting to be considered national security risks. Overall, the steel and
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aluminum tariffs on close allies do not make sense – it poses long-term risks that may only
undermine the U.S. economy while failing to address the actual problem.
Conclusion
President Trump’s primary economic argument for the 2018 trade dispute is misdirected.
By citing a large trade deficit as justification demonstrates a lack of understanding from this
administration. This is both dangerous and inefficient. Furthermore, it is arguably natural for the
U.S. to have a large trade deficit due to its large economy and the dollars’ prestige and safety. If
Trump genuinely wants to address the deficit, he should enact policies that target the investment
and savings rate. Using tariffs as tools have indirect effects at best and bring about a host of other
economic problems. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act serves a historical precedent and lesson – its
effect led to a collapse of global trade and a decline of overall living standards. The current trade
dispute has the potential to be even more devastating than one of the largest protectionist policies
the U.S. has ever pursued.
That said, Trump’s tariffs on China do address some of China’s unfair practices. Even
though China no longer manipulates its currency to boost its exports, the country's practice of
generous state subsidies and lax intellectual property protection pose serious harm to American
producers. These are valid concerns and are legitimate for the President to address. However,
using similar tariffs to target long-standing allies pose more risks than benefits. By citing
national security reasons as for the steel and aluminum tariffs, it damages the relationship with
key allies that have supported the U.S. in many international fronts and can lead to severe
economic consequences in the form of job losses. Ultimately, there are both legitimate and
misdirected economic reasoning to Trump’s 2018 trade dispute.
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Chapter 4 – The Art of the Deal?
It is tempting to dismiss President Trump’s view on the 2018 trade dispute as a part of his
overall unpredictable behavior. However, by looking through the disputes in the political and
economic perspectives, it is easy to see that his view on trade is rather dangerous. Frankly, the
evidence analyzed in this thesis serves as a direct rebuttal to his assertion that trade wars are
good and easy to win. From a political perspective, the long-term outlook for this trade war
appears to be bleak. While there are short-term gains by fulfilling campaign promises, American
voters will still catch on when conditions turn dire. More specifically, the retaliatory tariffs
disproportionately affect his supporters, who have not yet felt the effects. In other words, the
President is running a serious political gamble with the trade disputes that may backfire. His
initial supporters may abandon him as the trade disputes harm their livelihood and become too
overwhelming.
From an economic perspective, the President demonstrates his apparent misunderstanding
about trade, which may have contributed to his idea of trade wars being good and easy to win.
By not fully understanding how deficits work, it casts a cloud of doubt over the administration’s
other policies since many may deem them untrustworthy and uncapable. Nonetheless, there are
still legitimate reasons for utilizing protectionist policies on China as the Chinese have
demonstrated a knack for pursuing policies such as generous state subsidies and forced
technology transfers to gain unfair advantages. However, the U.S. should not go down this route
with allies. Besides being politically damaging, the tariffs on allies do not address the true
problem.
Overall, trade wars are far more nuanced and sophisticated than the President believes.
The stark departure from decades of free-trade advocacy serves as the potential to shake the
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foundation of U.S.-led global order. However, it is important for many to keep in mind that this
trade dispute should not be seen as an apocalyptic event. For many allies, while the President’s
rhetoric and some of his policies have damaged relations, the ultimate target is China.
For the current administration, although it is correct in targeting China, it must also
remember the harm that a trade dispute with the second largest economy in the world can bring.
Trump must also clarify his justifications as some are incorrect and only undermine his
legitimacy. The President must realize the political risks of engaging in a sustained dispute and
understand the correct economic reasons for engaging in such a trade war. Only then can he truly
demonstrate to his critics that his bombastic tweets are just a part of the larger plan to achieve a
better deal.
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